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Despite the fact that vertical integration has been a key question of management studies for 
more than fifty years, we still do not have a unified, coherent view of outsourcing. In 
particular, multiple theoretical perspectives such as transaction cost economics, industrial 
organization, a nd strategy, could explain the outsourcing decision, but the implications of 
these different streams have neither been theoretically integrated, nor tested 
simultaneously. In an attempt to disentangle the various causes of outsourcing, we suggest 
three different rationales for outsourcing: cost reduction, focusing on core capabilities and 
importing knowledge into the firm. We develop several hypotheses, which we then test on 
secondary data on French small- and medium-sized enterprises. Results indicate that the 
learning rationale appears to be the strongest factor influencing the outsourcing decision. 
Some performance implications of this rationale are also suggested and tested. 
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A COMPARATIVE TEST OF THE EFFICIENCY, FOCUS AND 
LEARNING PERSPECTIVES OF OUTSOURCING 
 
 
Corporations appear to increasingly rely on outsourcing. For example, 86% of 
major US corporations outsourced at least some services in 1997, up from 52% in 1992 
(A.T. Kearney consultants report, quoted in Byrne, 1996). According to Dun & Bradstreet, 
the market for “routine operational services” such as payroll management or IT functions 
doubled in size from 1997 to 2000 (quoted in Auguste, et al., 2002). Further, some surveys 
suggest that outsourcing is increasingly used in “sensitive” functions such as customer 
service, R&D or production, whereas in the past it only found widespread applications in 
“back-office” functions like IT, logistics and payroll management  (Baden-Fuller, et al., 
2000; Kimzey and Kurokawa, 2002).  
In s pite of the widespread use of outsourcing as an activity, outsourcing has not 
received extensive attention in strategy research. Perhaps this is due to the commonly held 
view that vertical integration and outsourcing are two sides of the same coin: when vertical 
integration is not needed, then outsourcing imposes itself. Yet several frameworks, often 
with conflicting predictions, have been formulated to predict vertical integration:  
transaction costs  (Williamson, 1975; 1985), industrial organization  (Stigler, 1951; Perry, 
1989), business history  (Chandler, 1962; 1990) and the resource-based view  (Argyres, 
1996). In addition, some recent views linking ‘learning’ and outsourcing have not been 
studied empirically.  
In this paper, we test which factors best predict outsourcing. The sample is drawn 
from French manufacturing industry in the period 1996-1997.  The paper is organized as 
follows. The next section reviews the main theories related to  vertical integration and 
outsourcing. After that, the methodology and empirical setting are briefly discussed. The 
section thereafter discusses the results and implications.   
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DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Although the use of the word “outsourcing”  is widespread both in the managerial 
and academic literatures, definitions of the term are surprisingly rare. Van Mieghem  (1999) 
provides one explanation by pointing out that outsourcing is a new word, appearing in the 
English dictionary a s late as 1982. Thus, outsourcing is not a well-established, univocal 
term with a long tradition of use. This stands in contrast to subcontracting, which, for some 
industries, goes back several centuries.  
In this paper, we define outsourcing as the act of transferring to another firm an 
activity that used to be conducted in-house, and,  by extension, the resulting state of not 
conducting that activity in-house anymore. Two points are particularly noteworthy about 
this definition. First, we give outsourcing  a precise and relatively narrow meaning 
describing the flow of an activity from within to outside the firm  (Greer, et al., 1999; Maltz 
and Ellram, 1999; Doig, et al., 2001). However, we also acknowledge the fact that the term 
outsourcing i s widely used as a  state variable, this time “summarizing” at one point in time 
the sum of transfers of activities that took place  (e.g. Lei and Hitt, 1995; Ulset, 1996; 
Insinga and Werle, 2000). Second, this definition implies that if the activity was  never 
carried out within the boundaries of the firm, one should not use the term outsourcing, but 
rather speak simply about buying, or sourcing. 
Three rationales for outsourcing can be identified in the literature: cost reduction, 
focus on core activities and learning from suppliers.  
THE EFFICIENCY VIEW 
A first group of theories considers vertical integration and outsourcing as a case of 
cost reduction. In this view, the choice of the boundaries of the firm is made on the basis of 
a cost–benefit analysis of alternative governance arrangements  (see Harrigan, 1983; Perry, 
1989; Mahoney, 1992 for comprehensive reviews). The majority of these studies make 
those analyses from a transaction-cost perspective  (Williamson, 1975; 1985). In this view, 
transacting in the market (and therefore outsourcing) is considered the default option. 
Integration is considered to be efficient only in the presence of three factors: asset  
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specificity, uncertainty and high frequency of the transaction. We will briefly comment on 
each in turn. 
First, transaction cost theory suggests that companies that are facing asset 
specificity in their relationships with suppliers are more likely to integrate to avoid being 
held up by a supplier. Specific assets lock the parties into a contractual relation with 
switching costs, possibly leading to costly bargaining in the case of a hold-up. Following 
this logic, companies may be expected to outsource in situations where the specificity of 
required assets is low. Thus, this view leads to a first hypothesis concerning outsourcing:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Asset specificity will be negatively correlated with outsourcing. 
A second factor affecting integration in a transaction-cost framework is the 
presence of uncertainty. In cases of uncertainty, contracts will be more complicated to 
write, as parties will have to forecast multiple contingencies. Assuming boundedly rational 
actors, the costs of transacting in the market will increase. In addition to this, uncertainty 
makes control and auditing of the task performance more complicated and costly. 
Integration reduces transaction costs because of the possibility of appealing to a higher 
authority in the hierarchy.  Firms therefore are predicted to internalize transactions that are 
subject to high uncertainty.  
Uncertainty however has many components, and various contributions have 
demonstrated that not all components have the same impact  (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 
1986). Yet, one type of uncertainty appears to have a systematic effect: demand uncertainty 
(Walker and Weber, 1987). Situations of uncertain demand will increase the likelihood of 
renegotiations of the initial agreement resulting in a loss of time and efficiency and 
exposure to  opportunism of the contracting partner. These incidences increase the cost of 
transacting in the market. If the same transactions were managed within one firm, problems 
could be dealt with through the use of fiat. Thus, we suggest:   
HYPOTHESIS 2: Demand uncertainty will be negatively related to outsourcing.  
In early formulations of transaction cost economics, Williamson included also the 
frequency of transaction as a determinant of the degree of vertical integration. In this case, 
Williamson argued that f or transactions with a low frequency, the cost associated  
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with the use of markets is lower than the cost of creating and administrating a hierarchy. 
Later formulations  (e.g. Williamson, 1995) downplayed the role of frequency: in the 
absence of uncertainty and asset specificity, transactions will be governed more efficiently 
in a market framework, regardless of the frequency with which they occur. However, 
anecdotal and case-based evidence suggest that an outsourcing decision may indeed also 
depend on the frequency of the transaction  (Bettis, et al., 1992; Venkatesan, 1992; Quinn 
and Hilmer, 1994). To test whether transaction frequency affects the extent of outsourcing, 
we will test the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS  3: Frequency of interaction will be negatively correlated with 
outsourcing. 
Two other views have complemented the transaction cost perspective to explain 
vertical integration: Stigler’s life cycle view and Chandler’s scale and scope perspective on 
firm growth. S tigler  (1951) expanded Adam Smith’s theorem that “the division of labor is 
limited by the extent of the market”, and inferred that emerging and declining industries 
are likely to lack sufficient volumes to justify an extensive division of  labor. To put it 
another way, activities with low volumes will more likely be vertically integrated because 
an independent firm that focuses on a single stage of the supply chain may not reach 
minimum efficient scale. This situation, according to Stigler,  is likely to take place in 
emerging and declining industries. Empirical studies have found support for this hypothesis 
(Tucker and Wilder, 1977; Levy, 1984). Although the argument applies mostly 
longitudinally, there is reason to believe t hat the effect would also show up cross-
sectionally, all other things being equal. In other words, young and declining industries 
would still, on average, show higher levels of integration (thus less outsourcing) than their 
growing and mature counterparts (Stigler, 1951, p. 190; Besanko, et al., 1996, p. 81). This 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS  4: Firms operating in industries in the emerging or declining stage of 
their life cycle will exhibit less outsourcing activity than t heir peers in growing or mature 
industries.  
The final rationale for using outsourcing to reduce costs comes from Chandler’s 
(1962; 1990) studies on the emergence of the modern industrial enterprise.  
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Chandler noted how the growth of these  firms relied on the exploitation of economies of 
scale and scope. Achieving these economies required the creation of bigger size factories, 
and therefore a higher level of fixed costs. Once their capital intensity increased, however, 
companies found themselves requiring “a constant flow of materials through the plant and 
factory […] to assure effective capacity utilization”  (Chandler, 1990, p. 24). This need to 
ensure throughput in turn served as a major motive for vertical integration  (Chandler, 1990, 
p. 37-38). Stated differently, capital intensity generates efficiency gains, but also raises the 
break-even point to higher production volumes, thus raising the risk profile of the 
organization. To manage this risk, companies  often choose to integrate, thus countering the 
increased risk with an increased amount of information about the activities of the whole 
value chain  (Arrow, 1975), as well as more direct control  (Harrigan, 1983; Richardson, 
1996). This leads to:  
HYPOTHESIS 5: Capital intensity will be negatively related to outsourcing. 
THE FOCUSING VIEW 
Outsourcing need not be exclusively driven by cost considerations; it could also be 
a means for companies to concentrate on their core competencies  (Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994; Quinn, 1999). The competence and resource-based views of the firm have argued 
that a firm’s competitive advantage is based on a number of skills and resources that are 
internally built.  In these views, outsourcing of core activities should only be used as a 
stopgap measure, a temporary solution while companies build their own internal 
capabilities  (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p. 84). While these 
views do not systematically address the outsourcing decision, it may be implied that 
outsourcing of non-core activities is compatible with the key tenets of these views; 
outsourcing saves resources (time, money, managerial attention) to be used in core 
activities  (Bettis, et al., 1992; Venkatesan, 1992; Welch and Nayak, 1992). Research by 
Markides (1992; 1995) on the extent of refocusing of corporations in the late eighties found 
that many companies that refocused also enjoyed higher performance. Thus, we suggest:  
HYPOTHESIS  6: The perceived relevance of an activity to a firm’s competitive  
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advantage will be negatively correlated with its outsourcing. 
THE LEARNING VIEW 
In the emerging knowledge based view of the firm, it is argued that a firm needs an 
ability to constantly reconfigure and update its knowledge base to sustain its position 
(Teece, et al., 1997; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Viewed from 
this perspective, suppliers may play a key role in ‘updating’ a firm’s competitive advantage 
(Matusik and Hill, 1998). Though outsourcing may undermine some of the isolating 
mechanisms protecting competencies, outsourcing will also supply new knowledge 
(Baden-Fuller, et al., 2000). That is, suppliers may possess resources that are 
‘complementary’ to those of the firm, generating a positive externality.  While suppliers 
can be expected to benefit from knowledge obtained from a firm, firms may also be 
expected to capture knowledge spillovers from its supplier base; a firm’s suppliers can 
become a network of learning (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). 
In a static, steady state environment, learning from suppliers is unlikely to confer a 
competitive advantage to a firm as everything that needs to be learned may already have 
been acquired. Yet, to the extent that environments are more dynamic, information 
exchange with suppliers could become more valuable. For example, technological 
uncertainty is likely to discourage i ntegration as the possibility of a major technological 
breakthrough will make companies wary of committing to any given standard 
(Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Walker and Weber, 1987). Outsourcing in this case 
gives companies an opportunity to “wait and see” until a dominant design has emerged 
while suppliers make the technological investment (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).  
We will test two hypotheses related to the ‘learning view’:  
HYPOTHESIS  7: Technological uncertainty will be positively correlated with 
outsourcing. 
HYPOTHESIS  8: Having constant information exchange with suppliers will be 
positively correlated with outsourcing.   
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In sum, the literature suggests several reasons why a firm may want to outsource 
activities: to improve its efficiency (reducing ‘transaction’ and ‘production’ costs); to free 
resources tied up in non-core activities, and to benefit from knowledge of suppliers. These 
reasons are not mutually exclusive. Yet, the type of outsourcing that is most often used 
may depend on the environment the firm is in. For example, one can expect efficiency 
outsourcing to be more prevalent in static environments and learning outsourcing to be 
more attractive in dynamic environments. In the following section, we d escribe the 
methodology we used to test the various hypotheses. 
METHODOLOGY 
SAMPLE 
The hypotheses were tested with data coming from Sesame, a comprehensive 
database created in 1994 by the Banque de France, the French central bank. The database 
has received some attention in the management literature and has already been used for 
research  (e.g. Cool and Henderson, 1998). Its aim is to complement the bank’s financial 
information with industry and firm data through questions on the firm’s business 
environment, organization, structure and strategy. In all, about 400 questions are asked. 
About 2000 CEOs of small- to medium-sized French firms (from 20 to 5000 employees) 
answer the questionnaire annually through face-to-face interviews conducted by Banque de 
France agents specially trained on survey techniques. These agents use a computer-aided 
questionnaire and rely on a user guide, which seeks to reduce the risks of misunderstanding 
the questions. The questionnaire has evolved over the years, and  in particular was 
substantially edited in 1998. We used data from 1996 and 1997 (4180 observations) in this 
research, and we complemented the database by additional financial information provided 
by the Banque de France. 
Several criteria were used to select our sample from the database. First, 
performance data were available only at the firm level and not at the business-unit level. 
We therefore restricted the initial sample to single-business firms, operationalized  
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as firms with at least 70% of their sales in a single industry  (consistently with Rumelt’s 
1974 definition of focused firms).  
Second, we excluded from the sample all firms that had indicated that their “main 
suppliers”
1 provided only “raw materials” (e.g. steel for a mold producer, fabric for a cloth 
manufacturer). The Sesame database contains data only on the main suppliers of 
companies. To avoid confusion between sourcing and outsourcing, we excluded the firms 
whose main suppliers essentially had a sourcing (or buyer-seller) relationship.  
Third, we needed information on the importance of the outsourced activities (to test 
hypothesis 6) and information about the suppliers of these outsourcing activities. Sesame 
provides information on the importance of several functions for competitive success. The 
only activity for which Sesame provides information both on the importance and on the 
level of outsourcing is production. To limit our sample to companies that made use of 
production related outsourcing, we excluded any firm that merely acquired support services 
from their main suppliers, as opposed to primary activities. Through this selection process, 
our sample was narrowed to companies whose main suppliers provided subcontracting and 
intermediate and semi-finished products. Our assumption is that the higher the importance 
of the production function, the less a company is expected to use these suppliers. 
Lastly, we only included in the final sample industries (defined at the French 
equivalent of four-digit SIC code) with 10 or more observations to control for industry 
effects. These successive selection criteria yielded a sample of 132 observations in 11 
industries (see Appendix A for a list of the sectors). Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of 
this final sample. The average firm has less than 200 employees, sales of around FF175 
million (around 26 million euros or dollars), and outsources about 16.5% of its sales 
volume (standard deviation: 18.5%; range going from 0 to 100%). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
1 The main suppliers are defined here as the combination of the “largest supplier” and the “next three suppliers”  
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MEASURES 
The questions we used  from the Sesame database are given in Appendix B. The 
dependent variable, the extent to which a company outsources, is measured by the ratio of 
outsourced activity to total sales.   
The first independent variable, asset specificity was measured by a five-point Likert 
scale seeking to capture the extent to which a focal firm invested in assets specific to its 
main suppliers.  Demand uncertainty was assessed by reversing a five-point scale capturing 
the CEO’s opinion about the maximum length of time over which strategic planning would 
make sense.  Frequency of transactions  was gauged by a five-point scale indicating the 
average length of time between two contractual negotiations. This scale was also reversed 
to obtain a straightforward interpretation of transaction frequency.  Capital intensity was 
measured by the fixed assets-to-sales ratio. Respondents were also asked to assess the Life 
Cycle of the market they were in. Four possibilities were given: emergence, growth, 
maturity or decline. In conformance with Stigler’s theory, we combined the emergence and 
decline phases into a single indicator and created a dummy variable.
2  
The focus hypothesis requires us to assess the importance (“core-ness”) of the 
outsourced activity. The Sesame questionnaire asks respondents to compare the importance 
of production to that of eight other activities (R&D, marketing, sales, finances, 
procurement, logistics, services and human resources) and rank the five most important 
ones from 1 to 5. Because of its rank-order nature, we converted this item to a dummy 
variable, measuring 1 if core was ranked anywhere in the top 5 activities, 0 otherwise.  
Two additional variables were needed to test the learning view hypotheses. 
Technological uncertainty was measured by the average of two five-point scales measuring 
the magnitude of both product and production process renewal rates at the industry level. 
Intensity of information exchange was assessed by the average of two five-point scale, 
                                                 
2 We also ran a regression with separate variables for emergence and decline; the empirical results did not 
change much.    
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measuring the focal firm’s information exchange with i ts suppliers concerning production 
processes and costs.  
A set of  control variables was also used in the model: they include a set of dummy 
variables  (NAF) to control for industry effects (SIC equivalents), and a dummy  (Group) to 
control for cases where the main suppliers and the focal firm belong to the same group.
3 
ESTIMATION 
As the purpose of this paper is to disentangle the different theoretical views 
pertaining to outsourcing, a full model was run, simultaneously incorporating all of our 
hypotheses. We first estimated our coefficients using ordinary least squares estimation. 
However, our dependent variable is limited (between 0 and 1), which means that the OLS 
coefficients are likely to be biased: Tobit estimation procedure corrects for this bias, and 
thus we also run a Tobit model (Kennedy, 1998, p. 249-251). . 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the zero-order correlations among all variables. The maximum 
correlation is 0.32, which does not suggest a collinearity problem. Among the independent 
variables, technological uncertainty and capital intensity are the only two that show some 
correlation with outsourcing, We should also note the correlation between the group 
control variable and frequency: it seems that when suppliers and clients are part of the 
same group, renegotiations happen only infrequently. This is consistent with a transaction 
                                                 
3 We also controlled for a possible year effect; however, since the questionnaire is sent to a specific number 
of industries each year, it is not possible to control both for industry  and for year at the same  time. 
Consequently, we report the models with industry controls. Results did not change with a year-effect control.  
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cost explanation, which suggests that the use of  fiat will reduce the need for continuous 
renegotiations of the contractual terms.  
Table 3 shows the results of the model, incorporating all variables (standardized 
coefficients). Overall, the OLS model is significant (F value: 1.77, p <0.05), and so is the 
Tobit model (likelihood ratio chi—square: 37.65, p<0.01). We also note that significance 
levels (and value of the coefficients) change only slightly between the two estimation 
procedures. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Control variables are insignificant with two exceptions. It appears that companies in 
the surgical equipment industry (NAF 3 31B) outsource significantly more than other 
companies (albeit only marginally so). Also, the Tobit estimation reveals a significant 
coefficient for the group variable: it seems that companies outsource less to suppliers in the 
same group than outside. 
Moving to our independent variables, we see that there is little empirical support for 
the efficiency view, positing that firms will outsource when market solutions are more 
efficient than internal organization. First, contrary to hypotheses 1 and 2, neither  asset 
specificity nor demand uncertainty has a significant effect on outsourcing. Though 
frequency does have a marginally significant impact on outsourcing (p<0.1), the coefficient 
shows the opposite sign from our expectations: more frequent contract renegotiations seem 
to increase the extent of outsourcing. This result runs counter to the original view that 
frequent transactions would slow outsourcing. We should note however that this coefficient 
becomes insignificance in the Tobit estimation, suggesting s ome instability of this result. 
Thus, hypothesis 3 is rejected. We also posited, following Stigler, that outsourcing would 
be more often observed in emerging and declining industry settings. We observe from table 
3 that this coefficient is not significant. Thus, the life cycle view on outsourcing is not 
supported in the present analysis. We note however that our sample is cross sectional, 
measuring different industries at a different point in their life cycle. A stronger test would 
be to track industries longitudinally. Data limitations of Sesame may be at the origin of the 
non-significant result. On the other hand, we note that the parameter measuring the impact 
of asset intensity on outsourcing is marginally significant in the Tobit estimation,  
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yielding weak support for Chandler’s view that outsourcing is less likely to take place if 
there is high capital intensity in production (hypothesis 5). 
The focus view of outsourcing was tested with hypothesis 6, inversely linking core-
ness to outsourcing. Although s howing the right sign, this hypothesis is not supported by 
our data.  – that is, we do not find a significant relation between the extent to which a firm 
considers production a core activity and its degree of oursourcing. Finally, all results 
support the learning perspective on outsourcing. First, the hypothesis linking outsourcing 
to technological uncertainty (hypothesis 7) is strongly supported (p<0.01), and this variable 
has the strongest standardized OLS coefficient ( b= 0.26). Second, higher information 
exchange leads to a higher extent of outsourcing (p<0.05), supporting hypothesis 8.  
FURTHER ANALYSIS 
In this section, we provide some exploratory insights about the consequence of 
outsourcing on performance. Because the first model’s results supported the learning view, 
we tested the impact of outsourcing on performance as predicted by this view. We 
expected positive performance consequences for firms outsourcing in situations of high 
technological uncertainty and high information exchange. We did not expect performance 
implications in the other three possibilities, as we did not see a clear link with performance. 
Formally, 
HYPOTHESIS  9: In conditions of high technological uncertainty and high 
information exchange, a higher degree of outsourcing leads to higher performance. 
The sample we used for this test is the subset of companies that are above the mean 
for both technological uncertainty and intensity of information exchange.
4 This cut our 
                                                 
4 These mean values were respectively 1.8 and 2.9 on a five-point scale  
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sample to 37 data points. We further tested for the presence of outliers and had to delete 
three more points.
5 Clearly, given the small sample, the test is merely exploratory.   
The dependent variable selected to test hypothesis 9 is Return on Assets (ROA).  
The following variables were used as control variables: a) barriers to entry, operationalised 
as marketing intensity (marketing outlays on turnover), b) power of suppliers, 
operationalized as a five-point scale measuring their perceived negotiation power; c) 
powers of customers, reverting an item that measures the extent of switching costs for 
customers, d) a C4 index, measuring the competitive intensity in the focal industry, e) a set 
of variables indicating the perceived competitive position of the focal firm vis-à-vis its 
main competitors in the areas of production  cost, selling prices and innovation. The 
Barriers-to-entry measure is a percentage – the other four variables are measured by a five-
point perceptual scale (Appendix C lists the questionnaire items used). Zero-order 
correlations are provided in Table 4. The table shows that outsourcing does have a positive 
correlation with ROA, as does the production cost efficiency variable.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Regression results of the explanatory variables on ROA are reported in Table 5. 
The small size of our subsample limits the power of the test. Despite this, the model is 
significant (F value for the model: 3.12 with p <0.05), and hypothesis 9 is supported 
(p<0.05). This result gives some initial support for the contingent claim: outsourcing leads 
to positive performance in conditions of high technological uncertainty and high 
information exchange with the supplier. It also validates the learning perspective on 
outsourcing. Given the size of this sample and the simple operationalization of the 
performance model, more empirical research is clearly needed, however. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
5 These two points were beyond three standard errors of the mean on each dimension, and were detected as 
outliers both on the standardized DFFIT and on Cook’s D measures (Cook and Weisberg, 1994; Kennedy, 
1998, chapter 19)  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Outsourcing may have been too often presented as a “one cure for all” managerial 
recipe. It has initially been offered as a way to cut costs, then as a way to focus the limited 
resources of the firm and more recently as a way to learn from supplying companies. Using 
data from the Banque de France on small- to medium- sized industrial firms, this study 
attempted to disentangle and empirically test these different theoretical views. 
We found that outsourcing is more prevalent under conditions of high technological 
uncertainty and high information exchange. We also gained some exploratory insights into 
the fact that higher outsourcing under these conditions  leads to higher performance. These 
results are consistent with the learning literature: firms can use suppliers of outsourced 
activities as knowledge sources, thus integrating the suppliers’ competence and experience 
with their own to achieve superior performance. Just as firms can learn from their 
customers  (Von Hippel, 1988), there appear to be opportunities to benefit from suppliers’ 
knowledge.   
More broadly, the results suggests that far from being just an easy solution to take 
care of secondary activities, outsourcing relations should be considered one source of 
renewal of a company’s knowledge base, in addition to the other corporate development 
activities already identified in the literature  (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Companies may 
need to keep on investing in the activities they outsource, however. Otherwise, their ability 
to understand and absorb external knowledge may be limited (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
In addition, firms that want to learn from their suppliers should also strive to create the 
appropriate context (in terms of incentives, attitudes and structural arrangements) to 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge from the supplier to the focal company: just 
outsourcing an activity will not ensure there is an effective and efficient transfer of 
knowledge  (Hamel, 1991; Matusik and Hill, 1998). In a way, this perspective on 
outsourcing shifts attention from what to outsource to how to outsource. 
The learning view also opens up the possibilities of a more nuanced approach to 
outsourcing, validating an observation made by Harrigan  (1983) almost two decades ago. 
Outsourcing is not necessarily a binary decision; there is a continuum of options along 
several dimensions (degree, stage, breadth and form) that makes outsourcing a  
 15
multi-faceted phenomenon. In particular, the learning perspective suggests that a company 
can simultaneously have both outsourcing and internal production for the same activity. 
Performing the  same activity in parallel with a valued and trusted supplier may be a very 
effective way to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, as members of both organizations 
would face similar contexts and thus would be able to understand each other better, thus 
creating a network of learning  (Powell, et al., 1996; Gulati, 1999). True complementarities 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece, et al., 1997) may yield positive effects to both buyer and 
supplier  (Matusik and Hill, 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). It may be interesting to 
note that while this observation is rarely made in the context of vertical 
integration/outsourcing, it has been stressed quite often in the context of alliances  (Hamel, 
1991; Mowery, et al., 1996) and supply chain relations (Dyer, 1996; Lincoln, et al., 1998; 
Blankenburg-Holm, et al., 1999). 
The positive coefficient on frequency (though contrary to our expectations) is 
consistent with a learning view, too. While traditional transaction cost arguments highlight 
the costs associated with meeting and renegotiating a contract, frequent transactions 
possibly also give rise to a stable relationship, a vital prerequisite for knowledge transfer 
between two parties (Szulanski, 1996; Dyer, 1997). Thus, high frequency can be associated 
with more learning, and therefore higher performance, contrary to TCE predictions.  
Finally, even our lack of results with the remaining TCE variables could be due to a 
learning effect, or more specifically to a lack of unlearning. R esearch has, to our 
knowledge, never made the distinction between an activity that was always fulfilled by the 
market (“sourcing”) and an activity that was once conducted in-house and was 
subsequently “out”-sourced afterwards (literally: “outsourcing”). In the latter case, there 
may be a need for the organization to “unlearn” certain practices linked to the outsourced 
activity  (Weick, 1979). Failure to do so would result in something akin to a “phantom limb 
effect”  (Roos and von Krogh, 1994): believing they still possess the competence inside the 
organization to perform a specific activity, firms would underestimate the hold-up potential 
of some relationships involving specific assets. In other words, under these circumstances, 
firms would fall prey to an overconfidence bias  (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Keiren, 
1991), overestimating their ability to reintegrate the outsourced activity. If this were the 
case, then we would not expect a clear link between asset specificity and outsourcing.  
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Clearly, more research is needed to shed some light on this topic, as well as to understand 
whether other factors could be involved. 
In conclusion, we want to  stress several limitations of the study. First, we restricted 
ourselves to production related outsourcing; other activities may be outsourced for 
different reasons. Second, the sample is relatively small and restricted to eleven industries. 
Third, the sample does not consider firms outside France and large firms in France. In spite 
of these limitations, we hope this paper contributes to a more comprehensive understanding 
of outsourcing. We observed that firms use outsourcing consistent with a ‘knowledge 
renewal’ for companies, as they learn from their suppliers. On a theoretical basis, we have 
tried to integrate ‘transaction-based’ and ‘production-based’ explanations of performance 
differences, as recently called for by several researchers  (Foss, 1999; Langlois and Foss, 
1999; Williamson, 1999). Our comparative analysis lends credence to the need to test 
different perspectives simultaneously.  
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NAF CODE  DESCRIPTION 
285D  Metal work: General mechanic 
291C  Equipment Manufacturing: Pumps and compressors 
292D  Equipment manufacturing: handling equipment 
292F  Equipment manufacturing: chilling material 
292H  Equipment manufacturing: Packaging machines 
311A  Electrical Equipment manufacturing: Transformers (<750kW) 
331B  Medical, Optical Equipment and Clock and Watch making: surgical 
equipment 
332B  Medical, Optical Equipment and Clock and Watch making: Scientific 
and technical equipment 
333Z  Medical, Optical Equipment and Clock and Watch making: Process 
control equipment 
342A  Automotive Industry: Car body manufacturers 
343Z  Automotive Industry: Equipment suppliers 
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APPENDIX B: ITEMS USED FOR THE OUTSOURCING MODEL 
OUTSOURCING:   The percentage of your sales contracted out is_____ % 
ASSET SPECIFICITY:  For your company, replacing your main suppliers will generate 
switching costs which are: 
  Low  Medium/ Low  Medium  Medium/ High  High 
DEMAND  UNCERTAINTY 
(R): 
What is the relevant timing horizon on which you can do 
strategic planning for your company? (Number of years) 
  1 (or less)  2  3  4  5 (or more) 
FREQUENCY (R):  Indicate the length of time of the contractual relations between 
two negotiations with your main suppliers 
  <3 months  3-12 months  1-3 years  3-5 years  >5 years 
LIFE CYCLE:  The market for this product is in the   emerging  stage 
    growing   
    mature   
    declining   
IMPORTANCE OF THE 
ACTIVITY (R) 
What are the activities that are mostly contribute in maintaining 
your positions on the markets? (Rank from 1 to 5, maximum) 
  SUPPORT ACTIVITIES:  PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: 
  •  Human Resources  •  Logistic 
  •  Marketing  •  Production 
  •  Technological development  •  Sales 
  •  Finance  •  Service 
  •  Procurement   
TECHNOLOGICAL 
UNCERTAINTY: 
In your field of activity, indicate the following measures of 
change for the past two years  
PRODUCTION PROCESS  0-20%  20-40%  40-60%  60-80%  80-100% 




Your level of information concerning your main suppliers is: 
PRODUCTION COSTS  Low  Medium/ Low  Medium  Medium/ High  High 
PRODUCTION PROCESSES  Low  Medium/ Low  Medium  Medium/ High  High 
Note: (R) indicates that the item was reversed for easier interpretation  
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APPENDIX C: ITEMS USED FOR THE PERFORMANCE MODEL 
 
 
POWER OF SUPPLIERS  Your main suppliers have generally a high negotiation power 
that enables them to dictate their terms: 










POWER OF CUSTOMERS 
(R) 
For your main clients, replacing you with one of your 
competitors will entail switching costs that are  
  Low  Medium/Low  Medium  Medium/ High  High 
RESOURCE POSITION:  In your main activity, which is your positioning vis-à-vis your 
main competitors on the following criteria: 
PRICE LEVEL:  Inferior  Inferior/ 
similar  Similar  Similar/ 
superior  Superior 
PRODUCTION COSTS:  Inferior  Inferior/ 
similar 
Similar  Similar/ 
superior 
Superior 
INNOVATION LEVEL:   Inferior  Inferior/ 
similar 





TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sesame population  Final sample 
Variable 
Min  Max  Mean  s  Min  Max  Mean  s 
Outsourcing  0  100  10.0354  16.6642  0  100  16.5227  18.5437 
Asset specificity  1  5  2.2803  1.2947  1  5  2.8106  1.3142 
Demand uncertainty  1  5  2.9512  1.3049  1  5  2.8864  1.2334 
Frequency  1  5  2.8444  1.2806  1  5  3.8561  1.2967 
Capital intensity  0  12.60  0.4363  0.3849  0.01  1.95  0.3122  0.2780 
Lifecycle  0  1  0.1476  0.3547  0  1  0.1006  0.3091 
Core  0  1  0.6796  0.4667  0  1  0.5682  0.4972 
Info exchange  1  5  3.1161  1.4019  1  5  3.0909  1.1254 
Technological uncertainty  1  5  1.5928  0.7304  1  5  1.8068  0.8729 
Sales (in 000FF)  5,199  9,214,299  192,138.27  426,379.24  15,527  1,795,568  175,983  265,373.7 
Employees  17  5296  179.47  282.83  31  1151  185.4394  213.8169  
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TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS (FULL SAMPLE, N=132) 
Correlation -0.03  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.74
Correlation 0.09   -0.06  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.25 0.45
Correlation 0.10   -0.15 † 0.02  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.21 0.07 0.79
Correlation 0.02   -0.14 † -0.02   -0.09  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.79 0.08 0.76 0.26
Correlation -0.20 * 0.08   -0.11   -0.16 † 0.07  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.35 0.18 0.06 0.41
Correlation -0.10   0.13   -0.10   0.09   0.00   0.32 **
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.30 1.00 0.00
Correlation 0.19 * 0.04   -0.02   -0.15 † 0.00   0.08   0.03  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.59 0.77 0.07 0.99 0.35 0.76
Correlation 0.13   0.11   -0.11   -0.14 † 0.09   0.12   -0.04   0.00  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.29 0.17 0.62 1.00
Correlation -0.09   0.14 † -0.02   -0.31 ** -0.04   0.05   -0.07   0.10   0.14
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.29 0.08 0.79 0.00 0.66 0.58 0.37 0.24 0.10
Correlation -0.09   -0.06   0.26 ** 0.09   -0.06   0.25 ** 0.04   -0.15 † -0.18 * -0.16 *
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.27 0.43 0.00 0.29 0.47 0.00 0.66 0.06 0.02 0.05
Correlation 0.13   0.07   -0.03   -0.02   -0.10   -0.09   -0.01   0.09   0.03   0.18 * -0.11  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.11 0.40 0.69 0.77 0.20 0.32 0.86 0.26 0.69 0.02 0.17
Correlation -0.04   -0.04   -0.03   0.12   0.05   -0.13   -0.20 * -0.07   -0.01   -0.01   -0.11   -0.09  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.15 0.55 0.13 0.01 0.42 0.92 0.92 0.17 0.25
Correlation 0.03   -0.05   -0.07   0.00   -0.03   -0.13   0.01   -0.09   -0.06   -0.08   -0.12   -0.10   -0.10  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.73 0.53 0.42 0.98 0.67 0.12 0.94 0.29 0.47 0.33 0.15 0.23 0.23
Correlation 0.15 † 0.00   0.04   0.04   0.00   -0.15 † -0.14 † 0.11   -0.05   -0.12   0.10   -0.08   -0.08   -0.08  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.07 0.96 0.61 0.62 0.96 0.07 0.09 0.20 0.58 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.32 0.30
Correlation -0.10   0.01   -0.11   -0.10   -0.02   0.21 * 0.16 * 0.15 † 0.02   0.07   -0.11   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.22 0.89 0.16 0.21 0.80 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.78 0.40 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.26
Correlation -0.07   0.02   0.14 † -0.06   -0.03   0.02   0.03   -0.01   0.06   0.06   -0.11   -0.09   -0.09   -0.10  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.37 0.85 0.09 0.47 0.74 0.78 0.69 0.87 0.43 0.50 0.17 0.25 0.25 0.23
Correlation 0.04   -0.07   -0.07   -0.08   -0.06   -0.08   -0.15 † 0.01   -0.02   0.05   -0.14 † -0.11   -0.11   -0.12  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.60 0.36 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.35 0.07 0.91 0.77 0.56 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.14
Correlation -0.02   0.01   0.04   0.12   0.07   -0.13   -0.06   0.02   0.04   -0.12   -0.10   -0.08   -0.08   -0.09  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.82 0.92 0.60 0.14 0.39 0.12 0.46 0.81 0.67 0.13 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.28
Correlation 0.06   0.02   0.03   0.04   0.23 ** -0.08   0.22 ** 0.01   0.13   0.08   -0.12   -0.10   -0.10   -0.11  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.50 0.76 0.74 0.66 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.89 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.18
Correlation -0.06   0.12   -0.21 ** -0.12   -0.03   0.28 ** 0.10   -0.03   0.05   0.04   -0.12   -0.10   -0.10   -0.10  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.44 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.23 0.67 0.52 0.59 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.22












































TABLE 2 (CONTD.) 
Correlation -0.08  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.34
Correlation 0.08   -0.09  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.32 0.27
Correlation -0.10   -0.11   -0.11  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.22 0.18 0.16
Correlation -0.07   -0.08   -0.08   -0.10  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.20
Correlation -0.09   -0.10   -0.10   -0.13   -0.10  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.24
Correlation -0.08   -0.09   -0.10   -0.12   -0.09   -0.11  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.28 0.18
† Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).







NAF331B NAF311A NAF292H NAF342A NAF333Z NAF332B 
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TABLE 3: OLS RESULTS – DETERMINANTS OF OUTSOURCING 
 
T-statistics in parenthesis 
†:  p<0.10  *:   p<0.05  **: p <0.01 
Constant -9.66 -17.03
(-0.85) (-1.37)
Asset specificity 0.05 0.00 0.09
(0.04) (0.06)
Demand uncert. 1.64 0.11 2.39
(1.20) (1.59)
Frequency 2.64 † 0.18 2.06
(1.93) (1.38)
Lifecycle 1.07 0.02 1.36
(0.20) (0.23)
Capital intensity -10.31 -0.15 -14.11 †
(-1.45) (-1.68)
Core -3.05 -0.08 -3.02
(-0.81) (-0.74)
Tech. uncertainty 5.60 ** 0.26 6.91 **
(2.96) (3.34)
Info exchange 3.34 * 0.20 4.59 **
(2.25) (2.78)
Group -6.74 -0.13 -12.31 *
(-1.39) (-2.16)
NAF285D -5.64 -0.09 -3.68
(-0.74) (-0.43)
NAF291C 3.70 0.06 4.39
(0.48) (0.51)
NAF292D -7.35 -0.11 -5.89
(-0.92) (-0.68)
NAF292F 0.46 0.01 1.88
(0.06) 0.23
NAF292H 2.49 0.03 3.18
(0.29) 0.35
NAF311A -6.70 -0.10 -6.62
(-0.90) (-0.80)
NAF331B -13.39 † -0.20 -15.78 †
(-1.71) (-1.82)
NAF332B -0.27 0.00 1.69
(-0.04) 0.22
NAF333Z -12.26 -0.17 -13.95
(-1.43) (-1.48)
NAF342A -2.70 -0.05 -1.79
(-0.35) (-0.21)
OLS Statistics Tobit statistics
R
2
0.23 Log likelihood -489.4659







TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS (SUB-SAMPLE, N=34) 
TABLE 5: OLS REGRESSION – PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS 
T-statistics in parenthesis 
†:  p<0.10  *:   p<0.05  **: p <0.01 
 
Outsourcing Correlation 0.33 *
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.05
Barriers to entry Correlation -0.22 -0.14
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.18 0.40
Supplier power Correlation -0.05   -0.13   0.11  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.76 0.42 0.51
Client Power Correlation 0.22   -0.03   0.07   -0.17  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.20 0.84 0.65 0.29
C4 Correlation 0.05   -0.01   0.09   -0.09   0.20  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.78 0.93 0.59 0.57 0.24
Price position Correlation -0.09   -0.04   -0.32 * -0.16   0.20   0.16  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.58 0.79 0.04 0.34 0.21 0.33
Correlation 0.39 * -0.01   0.07   -0.21   0.12   0.12   0.27  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.97 0.68 0.21 0.49 0.47 0.10
Correlation 0.05   0.01   -0.41 ** -0.11   -0.17   -0.36 * -0.09   0.00  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.77 0.97 0.01 0.52 0.30 0.02 0.59 1.00





















Outsourcing 0.06 * 0.33
(2.26)
Barriers to entry -0.03 * -0.45
(-2.60)
Supplier power 0.01 0.03
(1.93)




Price position -0.18 † -0.31
(-1.89)
Prod. cost position 0.20 ** 0.48
(3.23)
Innovation position -0.09 -0.20
(-1.08)
R
2
0.5
Adjusted R
2
0.34
F 3.12 *
Coefficient
Variable OLS